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ENGLISH SUMMARIES 
Andrea Szabó: Social situation of the Hungarian students
The study aims to present the socio-demographic characteristics of the sample. 
Hungarian college and university students represent the social elite of Hungarian 
youth. However the study demonstrates that this part of society is not without social 
inequalities.
The starting point of the analysis is Pierre Bourdieu’s theory about the process of 
transformation of people’s symbolic or economic inheritance into cultural capital. 
The study examines how each type of capital accumulation appears among certain 
groups of students.
In this study, we accept as a fact that in the Hungarian education system the selec-
tion of students, the reproduction of inequalities takes place especially in primary 
and secondary schools, but higher education also contributes to the reproduction of 
the positive or negative status positions of the family.
Rita Csőzik: Transformed Rebellion. The Hungarian college student’s political 
socialization change
After the political transition in Hungary the society fell into a social psychological 
crisis, which permeated political institutions. Although in this new process old 
social and political attitudes live on at an individual level, the differences between 
generations can also become perceptible from time to time. But we cannot speak 
about a generation of college students in the traditional sense. The rebellion of 
today’s youth can be considered rational, lacking any collective, common action, so 
as individualistic interests and life strategies, according to which one has to exploit 
fully the opportunities offered by the society come into focus, a new generation 
appears in front of us. The relationship between young people and our political life 
today is highly ambivalent, and we can speak much less about disillusionment than 
indifference, which may be coupled with a lack of knowledge. Their rebellion is not 
confrontational, not against the power, but it is a kind of withdrawal. Our research 
can contribute to pinpointing the complex relationship of the 21st century Hungarian 
university youth to the political system, and their related representations.
In this present theoretical study we summarize the theories and prior research 
results describing the changes in the life long processes of political socialization and 
the development of political values, identities, behavioural patterns and political 
culture. The study aims to provide a conceptual framework and background for 
those studies that are included in this volume. In our opinion the problem of 
political socialization is behind all those signifi cant processes that are mentioned 
by the authors. Behind party preferences, not denying the importance of cognitive 
and rational elements, there are cultural representations, agents of socialization, 
and such value patterns that are handed down from generations to generations.
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The democratic political socialization pattern that emerged following the political 
transition has a dualistic nature, similarly to that in the Kádár era, whereas a serious 
contradiction or tension arises between how the individual experiences life and the 
offi cial self-defi nition of the ‘existing democracy’ (coined after the term of ‘existing 
socialism’). The consequences of the escalation of this tension can be very serious, 
and possible scenarios can cover either the withdrawal of citizens’ loyalty or even 
the break out of an explosive social and political crisis.
What is happening in colleges and universities is a very interesting, but still 
neglected question. To what extent could a higher educational institution correct 
possible socialization defects? Do higher educational institutions offer democratic 
socialization patterns at all?
The dissatisfaction that is characteristic to almost half of the youth has been 
amalgamated in the negative attitudes towards the whole of the new capitalist 
system. The functioning of the new democratic rule and power structure arouse 
fundamental dissatisfaction among the youth, according to whom the anomalies of 
the system are related to the fact that in Hungary the functioning of the democratic 
bodies is not smooth and fully developed. On the other hand the functioning of the 
political life lacks transparency and is too complicated for them, so their aversion 
and feeling of ineffectiveness is very much understandable. There is a stereotype 
that politicians represent only particular interests and they act without the inclusion 
of the majority of citizens. There is an intensive distrust in the democratic 
institutions. The democratic system that has emerged after the political transition 
does not constitute a good frame of reference for self-identifi cation for the youth. 
Recently there has been multiple attempts to mobilize young people as a generation 
by Jobbik on the one hand and LMP on the other. They therefore speak about the 
’Kurucinfo’ and ’Critical Mass’ generations. According to research, young people 
tend to stave off the responsibility of involvement as a citizen; as far as democracy 
is concerned they expect the state to fulfi l its obligations as a welfare services 
provider, meanwhile social activism, and self-organizations and civil initiatives are 
not at all or far less attractive for them. The majority hope that democracy will 
guarantee personal safety, which means for them essentially the equality before the 
law and the respect of private life, and only at the very least the multiparty system 
and the protection of the rights of minorities. The age group between 25 and 35 
do not add up to a uniform generation and they revolt by not revolting at all. The 
majority of young adults struggle with an identity problem and can balance their 
life only with great diffi culties. The number of young people who have diffi culty in 
self-identifi cation is very high, primarily because more than one essential factors of 
self-identifi cation are incomplete. They do not know the history of their own family, 
and they are not familiar with Hungary’s past either. The defi ciencies of secondary 
school history education are the most palpable concerning the past sixty years. Before 
many young people there is no predictable, relatively safe career, stable community, 
reference group, and many of them have stepped outside time and space.
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In reality a rational revolt takes place, which lacks emotional charge, romanticism 
and redemption. Those who are in higher education do not turn against the value 
preferences of their parents, only utilize and exploit the opportunities provided by the 
society. The practical realization of the withdrawal option proposed by Hirschman 
(1995) can make way multiple manners. If they think that in this country there is 
nowhere or no reason to move forward, they take on a job or build an existence 
abroad, while those who stay in this country, since they are unable to build a future, 
spend their income on consumer goods and entertainment by which they keep 
themselves occupied, and take their mind off the problem that their generation is 
condemned to passivity. Withdrawal, keeping a distance from politics will determine 
the individual’s scope of action, and the possibility of protest will vanish, yet this 
withdrawal can be benefi cial from the point of view of the individual. It is also 
possible however that the existence of withdrawal as an option creates an obstacle 
for the development of protest techniques.
The research of Andrea Szabó and Tamás Kern indicates that the relationship of 
young people to politics is partly system independent, nevertheless, political events, 
macroeconomic and macro-social processes have an impact on the realization and 
character of socialization processes. The processes of political socialisation that 
have evolved during the years that have elapsed since the political transition are 
fundamentally defi cient. It seems that those agents of socialization that had already 
functioned in an insuffi cient manner in the Kádár era during the past two decades have 
started two show even more obvious signs of dysfunctional operation. This partially 
explains on the one hand young people’s lack of interest in politics and inactivity 
and on the hand their „fall-out”, and not departure, from the political society. But 
indifference concerning political questions does not imply that this youth are satisfi ed 
with their circumstances and opportunities in life. Youth that have entered adulthood 
since the political transition are not pioneers, rather followers, and do not play an 
active role in shaping events, rather passively suffer them. The political transition has 
largely failed to engender a new political generation, if at all.
Not every age group becomes a generation, and it is still an open question – as a 
number of studies in this volume point it out – if the people in this age group will 
be able to become one. What will be the guiding principles and the modality of 
their revolt? How will this revolt impact society? Will this revolt be able to create 
such strong and durable personal bonds, through which they can make their voice 
heard, will the self-identifi cation of this age-group be achieved? Will such new 
elite emerge through this rational revolt that would help this age group to be taken 
more seriously by the political class? Will their demands, aspirations leave a more 
signifi cant mark on political, economic and social political decisions?
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Andrea Szabó – Dániel Oross: Trends of political participation among hungarian 
university and college students
The results of Hungarian youth studies indicate that Hungarian youth is characterized 
by low degree of political affi nity and moderate political activity. According to the 
data on the electoral participation in 2010 among the Hungarian citizens under 
25 years it is recorded that higher than average is the willingness to participate. 
The subject of our analysis is a special group of youth, full-time university and 
college students. While this volume contains studies exploring party related 
motivations behind this trend, the present study aims to determine changes in the 
electoral participation via socio-demographic factor analysis. When approaching 
young people’s willingness to participate, the study points at factors linked to the 
growth of new opportunities offered by the internet and new forms of participation 
opportunities. By approaching the question of individual political participation 
from the resources necessary for participation (VERBA−SCHLOZMAN−BRADY 1995) 
online political participation does not require a lot of money, nor license, nor 
formal affi liation with an organization, it can be resumed any time and place. 
Therefore online political participation requires the reconsideration of earlier 
concepts on opportunities for political participation.  Unlike previous typologies, 
the present study distinguishes three groups of acts related to political participation. 
Under the notion of „traditional” forms, the participation we defi ning activities 
requiring lot of resources (membership fee, time, capacity) conscious, durable and 
continuous commitment. „Direct democratic” participation is defi ned as activities 
requiring personal involvement of citizens in actions that do not require long-term 
commitment. We consider these two forms of participation as „activity by feet” 
since they defi nitely require physical performance. Compared to these two forms we 
defi ne the concept of „new” or virtual participation that we actively call ‘like’. This 
„New” participation is multilateral participation based on activities, encompassing 
involvement in both traditional and direct forms of action via internet as a generic 
interface.
The results of our analysis indicate that:  
The validity of the earlier trend that interest in politics is set persistently at low 
level was not confi rmed by our data on full-time university and college students. 
An important result of the research is that in terms of traditional socio-demographic 
factors, there are no signifi cant differences detected in the electoral participation of 
students and the Hungarian adult population as a whole. Students attending social 
science courses, humanities, legal and administrative studies are the most interested in 
politics, while the lowest affi nity to political issues was detected among sports science 
students, students of medical and health sciences and students attending faculties of 
engineering. According to political preferences students are extremely interested in 
public issues among the supporters of „Jobbik” and Democratic Coalition. 
In our research, we have tested if there is empirical evidence to justify the different 
understanding of the concept of „interest in political” and „interest in public issues” 
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among full-time university and college students. The results indicate that the two 
areas are very similar, but not completely blurred together in the attitudes of young 
people. Interest in public issues is higher.
We observed if there is a difference between the preferences of the various forms 
of political participation according to the political orientation of the students. We 
assumed that the difference between the preferences of direct democratic and new 
participation may be that participation in the former is preferred by right-oriented, 
while participation in the latter is preferred by the left-oriented students. This 
hypothesis is supported by the fact that the left / center-left oriented students are 
members of online communities in a much larger proportion than right or center-
right oriented students.
Our analysis identifi ed the demographic features of the traditional, direct and new 
participation.
Three-tenths of the Hungarian college and university students do not participate in 
any political action or did not give a valid answer to our questions. 
It is important to note that independent participation is very rare (only 5−8%), that 
means one form of participation attracts another. If a student gets involved in any 
form of political participation, he or she will inevitably become more active in 
another form of participation too. 
Moreover, the data suggest that students „pooling” participation are the largest 
group of young students. They are also the ones who are present at all the three 
possible fi elds of activity.
Contrary to our hypothesis new participation did not become an independent, 
considerable factor, as an alternative of „activity by feet”, but it opens a new scene 
in the dissemination of opinions. In terms of democratization cyberspace does not 
bring signifi cant new opportunities.
The Active Hungarian Young People research of 2012 confi rms the results of the 
2010 wave of ESS. The participation level of students in direct democracy is really 
important. The key to political participation of the Hungarian university and coll-
ege students is direct democratic participation. 
Those students who are active in the repertoire of direct democratic forms of 
participation require increasing levels of self-involvement and thereby increasing 
individual risk of active participation are likely to be more active in other forms of 
participation. So − contrary to our expectations – the daily use of the internet is not 
the key of the Hungarian college and university students’ political participation. 
The political participation of this large social group can be understood through 
direct democratic participation that requires deeper personal concerns, and serious 
decisions in certain situations.  
Finally, it is worth taking into consideration those students who are the most 
active politically, students „pooling” participation. Analysing the three forms of 
participation together it can be concluded that the socio-demographic, socio-cultural 
background of the emitting family (eg. higher social status, sex, father’s / mother’s 
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level of education), political socialization processes and individual competencies, 
that is, certain factors predisposing political participation determine which groups 
of people politicize.
Students attending religious higher education and students of state universities, 
Master and PhD students are the most active students. As for the different course 
structures on the one hand students of social sciences, humanities and arts and stu-
dents of legal and administrative studies are the most active, most of them take the 
increased awareness of political issues from home. On the other hand less oriented 
toward the political issues are students of sports science, medical and health scienc-
es, engineering and economics. It is worth pointing out that the former privileged 
students are freer use of their time, but in the latter training areas students are much 
more restricted, they receive consistently a huge amount of studies, so they have 
less time for political activity. The virtual space can create greater opportunities for 
the latter group, which does not require extra time for individual activity, compared 
to the normal daily routine of the internet use. 
Dániel Róna − Anett Sőrés: Kuruc.info Generation. Reasons behind Jobbik’s high 
popularity among the Hungarian youth
The electoral success of Jobbik drew enormous public and scientifi c attention. Al-
though many scholars detected Jobbik’s remarkable popularity among the youth, 
no in-depth study dealt with the reasons behind the phenomenon. This paper es-
tablishes fi ve hypotheses which could explain the young characteristics of radical 
constituency: policy preferences, anti-establishment attitude, economic recession, 
internet-usage and subculture. Each assumption is investigated with respect to the 
following questions: why would became either youngster Jobbik-voter whereas the 
other one not; why could Jobbik gather much more supporters among the youth; 
especially among 18-21 years old voters; and why did the radical breakthrough 
occurred after 2008? The analysis is based on our primary data collection: we con-
ducted an online survey among appr. 1500 university and college students. The 
data-collection was completed by 200 face-to-face interviews in order to ensure an 
unbiased and representative sample. Comparing our data with other youth database 
and representative survey samples of the full population we were able to pinpoint 
the main differences between age groups and between opinion climate at 2008 and 
2011. 
The empirical evidence suggests that economic recession did not play an important 
role in the success of Jobbik. Poor students do not tend to prefer Jobbik more than 
other parties. Although it is true that living standards worsened between 2008 and 
2011, this tendency affected every age groups at the same extent, thus there is no 
reason to assume that this is the reason behind Jobbik’s success among the young-
est cohort. 
Value preferences do not explain such a sudden ascendance and the over-represen-
tation either. Regarding autoritharianism, prejudice, leader cult and pro-order atti-
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tudes youngsters do not differ signifi cantly from their older counterparts. However, 
political views are strongly correlated with party preferences: according to our mul-
ti-variate logistical regression model radical and pro-order opinions – especially 
anti-Roma sentiments – are strong predictors of Jobbik-vote. In our interpretation, 
Jobbik’s popularity is caused by the salienace of Roma issue – not by shift towards 
prejudicial stance in the electorate. 
Anti-establishment attitude is a more powerful explanatory variable. The entire 
Hungarian population is disappointed with elite but the youth showed a paramount 
disaffection. Trust in political institutions and satisfaction with the way democracy 
works shrunk dramatically since 2006, especially among the youngest generation. 
Not only youngsters are not interested in established political parties but they tend 
to be more sceptic about democracy as well. It is striking that only 40 percent of 
the students – and only 20% of Jobbiks-supporter students – think that democracy 
is the best political system, whereas every third respondents agree that dictatorship 
can be better in certain circumstances. This is a much more serious problem than 
simple dissatisfaction with the way democracy works – this undermines the funda-
mental democratic commitments.  
We also examined how internet-usage infl uences university student’s political par-
ticipation in general and young people’s preferring extreme right party in particu-
lar. Despite that young students use alternative communication channels (internet, 
web2 etc.), it was proved that they do not use these for political activities, e.g. 
adding comments or voting on websites. Radical right wing youngsters, however, 
are over-represented among active citizens. They prefer consuming extreme right 
webpages which are essential parts of their subculture. One of the most popular 
partisan website in Hungary is Kuruc.info (closely linked to Jobbik): an extremely 
harsh, racist, anti-Roma and anti-semitic web page.  
These results already refer to the subculture’s key role in students’ extreme right 
preferences. Radical youngsters participate more intensively in cultural, politi-
cal and sport organizations. We also found signifi cant differences between radical 
and non-radical students regarding their desire to belong to such communities: the 
former group showed remarkable willingness to join civil associations.
Unoccupied, zippy, energetic youngsters – especially teenagers – tend to have more 
time and enthusiasm for community-activities. This is why Jobbik is extraordinary 
popular among the 18−22 age cohort. In Eastern-Hungary Jobbik is almost the 
only option for interested and active youngsters. The radical party holds the vast 
majority of demonstrations, youth forums, camps: other political forces have insig-
nifi cant activity next to Jobbik. Radical subculture has its own popular music style, 
bands (national rock), events, clothes etc. This life-style – especially its militant, hi-
erarchical component – suits much more for man than for woman: Jobbik is almost 
twice as popular among male students. To sum up, out of the fi ve hypotheses, only 
the subculture approach can elucidate the extremely high popularity in youngest 
(18−21) strata. The qualitative research also suggest that the key factor is the grass-
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root of the party: most youngsters are appealed through radical concerts, festivals, 
youth organisations and internet forums.
András Keil: About the „Critical Mass Generation”. Analysis on the LMP-voter 
students.
Nowadays we could hardly fi nd such publications in political science, which 
aim to study the LMP (Lehet Más a Politika – Politics Can Be Different) party’s 
voter base. The breakthrough of Jobbik (the extreme right party in Hungary) 
inspired many papers, but the reasons of LMP’s success have not been suffi ciently 
investigated yet. First of all, it is worth clarifying how we can characterise LMP 
voters, their social background and their way of thinking. In order to understand 
these characteristics, we should study a well-separable part of green voters: the 
young students. The Active Youth in Hungary 2012 research focused on this target 
group; after analysing the database, we can highlight the features of the so-called 
„Critical Mass Generation”.
 Data recorded in 2011-2012 shows, there is a part of youngsters who are inter-• 
ested more than the average in public issues, social problems, and their com-
mitment towards democracy is unquestionable. This empirically detected group 
is the so-called „Critical Mass Generation”. This group consists of mostly LMP 
voters and partially voters of DK (Demokratikus Koalíció – Democratic Coali-
tion; party of the former PM, Ferenc Gyurcsány). As for attitudes, voters of 
LMP and DK have a lot of common attributes. 
 The Hungarian green party has the second oldest voter group among university • 
and college students. Therefore, most of LMP supporters work regularly and 
have a stable fi nancial background. Additionally, LMP voters work the most 
among Hungarian students.
 Majority of LMP supporters are females: 56 % of green voters consist of wom-• 
en. Every third female among students (who can choose a party) is LMP voter. 
 Supporters of the party had a great success in 2010, the last parliamentary elec-• 
tion, are mostly high-qualifi ed people
 The family background of LMP voters comprises well-educated parents (this • 
ratio is more than the average) and internally, LMP supporters study mostly 
humanities, economics and social sciences. 
 Among university and college students, voting willingness on LMP is directly • 
proportional to settlement size. The bigger the town somebody lives in, the more 
the willingness to vote on LMP rises.  It is a controversial phenomenon among 
LMP supporters that there are huge social differences. High-class students and 
students fi ghting with regular fi nancial troubles are both overrepresented in our 
sample.
 Furthermore, LMP supporters can describe as people interested in public issues, • 
social questions more than the average. In contrast, strictly political topics are 
rather far from them. We can also see it if we consider data about the level of 
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trust in political institutions: organisations directly linked to politics are more 
undervalued than the average. This anti-political attitude is probably stimulated 
by the message used by the party during the election campaign in 2010. The 
anti-establishment nature of this political community and the name of LMP 
(“Politics can be different!”) imply that this phenomenon is not an accidental 
characteristic among supporters. In this context, it is also important to underline: 
LMP voters are characterised with the most autonomous way of thinking, the 
independence from effects of friendship and parents. 
  University and college students perceive mostly political issues as confl ict situ-• 
ations. In their view, government vs. opposition, Roma vs. non-Roma people 
relationships are the most divisive ones. Among LMP supporters, it is supple-
mented by the perception of confrontation between poor and rich people. Re-
garding the judgement of confl icts, there can be detected a „mild” left-oriented 
way of thinking and social sensitivity among LMP voters.
 LMP supporters do not like traditional participatory techniques (voting, activist • 
role, etc.), but some of them can be canalised into this type of activities with the 
help of the internet. 
 Studying value preferences among students, we can state: LMP supporters are • 
linked to the post materialist values (following Ronald Inglehart) but this phe-
nomenon is not an emphatic one. Nevertheless, it is important to note this rela-
tionship to understand green voters in the future. 
 As for their self-defi nition, LMP voter students are more left-oriented (on a left-• 
right scale) and more liberal (on a liberal-conservative scale). Moreover, the 
Hungarian green party has the second most moderated voter base. 
 The sub-cultural nature is an important cohesive power of this group – Critical • 
Mass festival is a real sub-cultural event and it is visited by mostly green vot-
ers. 
The existence of this Critical Mass generation can also highlight the importance of 
new parties in Hungary. Given the outstanding support of LMP and Jobbik among 
youngsters, it is important to focus on studying this phenomenon in order to predict 
future trends of the Hungarian democracy. 
Roland Reiner − Dániel Oross − András Keil: A new chapter in the relationship 
between Fidesz and the youngest age group of voters?
The relationship between young people and Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats), 
the party that is indicating youth in its name is a determinative issue of public 
opinion in Hungary since the founding of the party. Our objective was to explore 
the socio-demographic background and attitudes of voters who, despite record-high 
proportion of uncertain young people hold out their favourite party, Fidesz. 
The extraordinary popularity of Fidesz within the youngest age group of voters 
was a two-decade trend of Hungarian politics. However we assume that by 2012, 
in terms of party preference a new formula is valid for the youngest generation of 
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voters (the 18−29 age group). Our hypothesis is that the current government party 
has lost its former „young” character; the clear dominance of the party measured 
among the youngest voters is utterly lost.
As for the features of young Fidesz voters, the results of the research Active Youth 
in Hungary 2012 found that the key element of the identity of the ruling party’s 
voters is religion. Those young people who said that religion has signifi cant role in 
the lives are very likely to strengthen the camp of Fidesz. Fidesz has very strong 
positions among the upper-middle-class students. As for territorial distribution of 
young voters, the research indicates that Fidesz has the biggest embeddedness in 
Budapest. As for their political socialization, young voters of Fidesz often talk 
about political issues with their parents and the opinions of the young supporters 
of the ruling party are determined by the opinion of their parents. Looking at the 
breakdown of students in different training areas most young voters of Fidesz can 
be found among the students of medical sciences. 
While during the period of 1990−2010 Fidesz was clearly dominant among young 
people, according to the data based on our special sample of university and college 
students, we witnessed a turning point in the former trend. The former assumption 
that Fidesz is the favourite party of young people was not justifi ed by our data.
Two new parties, Jobbik and LMP have entered into the Parliament following the 
2010 elections, and those parties have carved out an important part of young voters 
from Fidesz. In the age group of 18−29 years the rise of Jobbik and LMP is clearly 
visible, while Fidesz have no longer a youthful character. If we approach our research 
fi ndings from a generational perspective, Fidesz as the representative of the generation 
of the late Kádár era is separated from the generation that walks behind him. 
András Bíró Nagy: Diverse young Hungarian left.
The results of this study prove the hypothesis that young supporters of the Hungar-
ian Socialist Party (MSZP) and Democratic Coalition (DK) represent two different 
worlds. The difference between the voters of the two parties is so signifi cant that it 
can be comfortably stated: in terms of their social background, activity and values 
there is more to connect the supporters of LMP and DK, than the youngsters of 
MSZP and DK.
Of the students in higher education only the supporters of MSZP come from a 
non-privileged background. The qualifi cations of their parents are in line with the 
nationwide average, whereas their fi nancial situation is slightly worse. Their fami-
lies hava a considerable infl uence on their political socialization, which, amongst 
others, is because they hardly discuss public affairs with their friends. MSZP vot-
ers’ interest in politics is lower than the average. The young supporters of MSZP are 
especially passive. It is a signifi cant challenge for the party to get them involved in 
demonstrations and campaigns while their willingness to participate in the election 
is not better than the average. 
Yet MSZP can benefi t from the fact that their young supporters stand closer to the 
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centre and the average Hungarian youth’s values, than the more liberal DK and 
LMP. The latter two parties - and naturally to a greater extent does LMP – quite 
possibly cover completely those young people who emphasize post-materialistic 
values, as well as sharing a liberal perspective on cultural, economic and social 
policy related issues. MSZP – especially in the light of its traditional leftist strategy 
they have followed since 2010 – should not take a similar direction, instead pursue 
a leftist economic policy in comparison to the two more liberal parties for people 
with average or worse backgrounds. This way they could have a chance of increas-
ing their support base among those young people who are open for more a centrist 
social policy. Moreover, MSZP’s offi cial stance on politico-economic questions is 
even further to the left from the young socialists’, exactly where the young follow-
ers of of Fidesz and Jobbik place themselves.
In the Hungarian party system all parties to the left from Fidesz are overrepresented 
in Budapest. This is particularly true for DK and LMP. The level of qualifi cation 
and the fi nancial situation of the parents both put the voters of LMP and DK in a 
pole position. In terms of public activity LMP does better than MSZP, but lag be-
hind DK. The reason for that is that LMP’s support structure is twofold. Next to a 
very active core – who are ready to collect signatures and campaign – the party also 
has a more apolitical support base, who are diffi cult to convince even to participate 
in the elections. On the other hand the supporters of DK – which is nevertheless 
the smallest party on the left – are almost all very determined. It is in DK’s circles 
where the greatest interest in public life can be detected, as well as a willingness to 
vote. Moreover, they are the most frequent consumers of online news. In the values 
of DK and LMP the data show an almost complete overleap. In economic terms 
they are both proponents of individual responsibility and a small state, whereas in 
terms of social policy they represent the liberal angle. Among the MSZP supporters 
the fi nancial security and the safety of their family, while for DK’s and LMP’s peo-
ple freedom are the most important values. In some socio-cultural questions – e.g. 
religion, gender, Hungarians in neighboring countries – the young supporters of the 
socialists also place themselves on the liberal side, but closer to the center. 
There are however a great deal of questions on which MSZP, DK and LMP take a 
completely different stance. Beyond the role of the state such topics include law 
and order. In questions of authority the supporters of MSZP place themselves on 
the conservative side. The socialists are much less committed to democracy than 
the other two parties and the fi nancial situation is a much more relevant problem 
for them. Their judgments regarding the Roma community is also visibly different. 
The socialists have very similar anti-Roma attitudes to the ones of the supporters of 
Fidesz, whereas the people of DK and LMP represent a much more liberal view.  
The parties of the left benefi t from the fact that their young supporters receive their 
information through channels where communication is the cheapest, and where the 
opposition’s media is the strongest to date. Today the majority of the young sup-
porters of all three parties of the left can be reached via online, but only those of DK 
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and LMP are really frequent users. Communication with the younger generations is 
made more expensive by the fact that even the socialist students in higher education 
read less online news while television remains very popular among them. 
Based on this research, the young people of the left can be divided into two 
liberal and one economically leftist, culturally centrist groups. The differences in 
opinion between the two liberal parties, DK and LMP are not based on socio-demo-
graphic background, questions of public life or attitudes, but rather on their assess-
ment of the established left’s results from the last time they were in government. 
It is evident that for LMP, which completely rejects „the last twenty years”, would 
refuse to cooperate in any ways with former PM Ferenc Gyurcsány, who embodies 
the last MSZP-SZDSZ government – regardless of what liberal values he repre-
sents. Whereas for the people at DK Gyurcsány is who motivates them the most. If 
we add this cleavage to the differences in social background and attitudes between 
the three parties, then it is clear that it is diffi cult to fi nd a common ground among 
the young left beyond simply opposing the right-wing Fidesz government. 
